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1. The Model
There are n retailers treating akind of product. Each of them buys products ffom asupplier
and sells them to customers. Each retailer faces an independent demand. We treat acase
of asingle period with no inventory at the beginning of the period. At the beginning of the
period, each retailer tries to choose his best order quantity in order to meet a(uncertain)
demand in that period. The inventory carrying cost occurs for the units that are not sold
at the end of the period. The penalty cost occurs when aretailer does not order enough
products to meet ademand. If some of retailers make acoalition, menbers in the coalition
can transfer their demands among them. If one is short of supply its excess demand is
fulfilled by those who have excess supplies in the coalition. This transfer takes place freely.
So the coalition decides order quantities of its menbers. All retailers are assumed to have
knowledge of all the parameter values of all participants. The purpose of this report is to
model this situation as acoalitional game where the characteristic function is the expected
profit, and we examine whether the core of this game is nonempty.
If all of the $n$ retailers are identical, that is, they have the same parameters (sales price,
buying cost, salvage value, and lost sales penalty), then the model reduces to the model in
[3]. Game-theoretic analysis of economic-lot-size problems is analyzed in detail in [2]. In [5],
the demand transfer is included in the model with 3retailers, and ffactions of excess demand
are transfered to other excess supplies, and ffactions are given constants.
We use the following notation. :
$N:=\{1, \ldots,n\}$ :The set of $n$ retailers. We call asubset of $N$ acoalition;
$q_{i}$ : Order quantity of Retaler $i$ ;
$X_{i}$ : Random demand for Retailer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ product;
$f_{i}(x)$ : Probability density function of $X_{i}$ ;
$F_{i}(x)$ : Cumulative distribution function of $x_{i}$ ;
$s_{i}$ : Sales $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}$ for Retailer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ product;
$c_{i}$ : Buying $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}/\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}$ for Retailer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ product;
$r_{i}$ : Salvage $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}$ for Retailer $i’ \mathrm{S}$ product;
$p_{i}$ : Lost sales $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}/\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}$ for Retailer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ product;
$\Pi_{i}$ : Random profit for Retailer $i$ ;
For an $n$-tuple $\{z_{i}\}_{i\in N}$ and acoalition $S\subseteq N$ , we let $z(S):=\Sigma_{i\in S}z_{i}$ , $z_{S}:=\{z_{i}\}_{i\in S}(\in R^{S})$ , and
$\overline{z_{S}}:=(z_{S},0_{N\backslash S})(\in R^{N})$ . We assume
$r_{i}<c_{i}<s_{i}$ , for all $i\in N$ . (1)
In this report, all of the random variables are defined on aprobability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P)$ . Also
we assume $X_{i}\in \mathcal{L}^{1}(\Omega,\mathcal{F}, P)$ for all $i\in N$ . The salvage value defined above can be considere $\mathrm{d}$
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as the resale value of Retailer i’s product minus its inventory carrying cost. For arealized
value $x_{\mathrm{t}}$ of the random variable $X_{\dot{x}}$ and for agiven order quantity $q_{i}$ , the profit of Retailer $i$
when he behaves by himself is
$\Pi_{i}(q_{i},x_{i})=\{$
$(s_{i}-c_{\iota})q_{i}-p_{i}(x_{i}-q_{i})$ , if $x_{i}\geq q_{i}$ ;
$s_{i}x_{i}-c_{i}q_{i}+r_{i}(q_{i}-x_{i})$ , if $x_{i}\leq q_{i}$ ,
$=(s_{i}-\mathrm{q})q_{i}-\{$
$p_{i}(x_{i}-q_{i})$ , if $x_{i}\geq q_{i}$ ; (2)
$(s_{i}-r:)(q_{i}-x_{i})$ , if $x:\leq q_{i}$ ,
$=(s_{i}-c.)q_{i}- \max\{p_{i}(x_{i}-q_{i}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}-x_{i})\}$
2. Profit of aCoalition
Acoalition $S\subseteq N$ , for realized values $\{x_{i}\}_{i\in S}$ , transfer demands so that the sum of the
menbers’ profits is maximized. For this purpose, they must solve aproblem :
Maxi $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}$ $\sum_{i\in S}\Pi_{i}(q_{i},\xi_{i})$
(3)
$\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{t}$ . $\xi(S)=x(S)$ , $\xi_{i}\geq 0$ $\forall i\in S$ .
We let the maximum value of this problem be $\Pi_{S}(q_{S},xs)$ and then let $J_{S}\{qs):=E[\Pi_{S}(q_{S},X_{\mathrm{S}})]$ .
Proposition 1.
$J_{S}(q_{S})= \sum_{i\in S}(s_{i}-\mathrm{q})q_{i}-\dot{m}n\{p_{i}\}i\in S\int_{x(S)>q(S)}[x(S)-q(S)]\Pi_{i\in S}f_{i}(x:)dx_{i}$
$- \dot{m}n\{s_{i}-r_{i}\}i\in S\int_{x(S)<q(S)}[q(S)-x(S)]\Pi_{i\in S}f_{i}(x_{i})dx_{i}$ .







$\sum_{i\in S}\Pi_{i}(q_{i},\xi_{i})=\sum_{i\in S}(s_{i}-c_{\mathrm{a}})q_{i}-\sum_{i\in S}rmx\{p_{i}(\xi_{i}-q_{i}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}-\xi_{i})\}$
.
So
$\Pi_{S}(q_{S},x_{S})=\sum_{i\in S}(s_{i}-c_{i})q_{i}-m$\xi.n\sum_{i\in S}mx\{p_{i}(\xi_{i}-q_{i}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}-\xi\dot{.})\},\cdot$
Case (I): $\mathrm{x}(5)\geq q(S)$ .
(i) $\xi_{i}\geq q_{i}$ for all $i\in S$ .
We consider $r \dot{m}n_{\xi}\sum_{i\in S}p_{i}(\xi_{i}-\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t})$ . This is linear in $\xi$ , so it is minimized at an extreme point of
the feasible region. For each $i\in S$ , an extreme point is given by $:\xi_{i}=x(S)-q(S\backslash \{i\}),\xi_{j}=qj$
for all $j\in S\backslash \{\mathrm{Q}$ . Checking at extreme points, we have the minimum : $7\dot{m}n_{i\in}s\{p_{i}\}(x(S)-q(S))$ .
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(ii) $\xi_{i}\leq q_{i}$ for $i\in T(\subset S)$ and $\xi_{i}\geq q_{i}$ for $i\in S\backslash T$ .
We consider
$\sum_{i\in T}(s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}-\xi_{i})+\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}p_{i}(\xi_{i}-q_{i})$
. (5)
Suppose the minimum is attained at 4’ and assume $\xi_{i}^{*}<q_{i}$ for some $i\in T$ . Since $\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{S})=\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{S})\geq$
$\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{S}$), there exists $i\in S\backslash T$ such that $\langle;>q_{j}$ . Oeffie $\xi^{\epsilon}$ by $1:=\xi_{i}^{*}+$ $\epsilon$ for $x=i,$ $=\xi_{j}^{*}-\epsilon$ for
$x=j$ and $=\xi_{x}^{*}$ for $x\neq i,j$ . Then the value of the function (5) decreases. This contradicts
the optimality of $\xi^{*}$ . Hence $\xi_{i}^{*}=q_{i}$ for all $i\in T$ . Then the argument in (i) applies and the
minimum of the function (5) is $\min_{i\in}s\backslash \tau\{p_{i}\}(x(S)-q(S))$ .
Consequently, the $\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}$ nimum is $m|nies\{Pi\}(x(S)-q(S))$ .
Case (II): $x(S)\leq \mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{S})$ .
In the same way as in Case (I), the minimum is $\dot{m}n_{i\in S}\{s_{i}--\mathrm{n}\}(\mathrm{q}(\mathrm{S})-\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{S})$ .
So we get the equation (4). $\bullet$
When his order quantuty is $q_{i}$ , ffom Proposition 1the expected profit of Retailer $i$ is
$J_{i}(q_{i})=(s_{i}-c_{i})q_{i}-(s_{i}-r_{i}) \int_{0}^{q}.(q_{i}-x)f_{i}(x)dx-p_{i}\int_{q_{i}}^{\infty}(x-q_{i})f_{i}(x)dx$ .
We let
$v( \{i\})=\max_{qi\geq 0}J_{i}(q_{i})$ .
Then we have
$\frac{dJ_{i}(q_{i})}{dq_{i}}=(r_{i}-s_{i}-p_{i})\int_{0}^{q_{t}}f_{i}(x)dx+s_{i}-c_{\iota}+p_{i}$ , $\frac{d^{2}J_{i}}{dq_{i}^{2}}=(r_{i}-s_{i}-p_{i})f_{i}(q_{i})<0$ ,
so Ji(qt) is maximized at $q_{i}^{*}$ where
$F_{i}(q_{i}^{*})= \frac{s_{i}+p_{i}-c_{r}}{s_{i}+p_{i}-r_{i}}$ ( $<1$ , by (1) ).
So $\mathrm{v}(\{\mathrm{z}\})\geq 0$ if and only if
$\int_{0}^{q}:xf_{i}(x)dx\geq\frac{p_{i}}{s_{i}+p_{i}-r_{i}}E(X_{i})$.
3. Cooperative Games and the Core
In this section we derive acooperative game and show that its core is nonempty. We
define afunction $v:2^{N}arrow R^{1}$ by
$v(S)= \max J_{S}(qs)qs\geq 0^{\cdot}$ (6)
For $S\subseteq N$ , suppose demands $\{x_{i}\}_{i\in S}$ are realozed. Members in the coalition $S$ will transfer
demnds ($\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , Problem (3)) and determine order quantities ($\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , Problem (6)) cooperatively
so that the sum of the members’ profits is maximized. We regard the pair $(N,v)$ as a
(cooperative) game with sidepayments. The core of the game $(N,v)$ is asolution-concept in
cooperative games and it is defined by the set of $n$-tuples $y=$ $(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{n})$ satisfying
$\mathrm{y}(\mathrm{S})\geq \mathrm{y}(\mathrm{S})$ , for all $S\subseteq N$, and $y(N)\leq v(N)$ .
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Abalanced set $\{S_{1},$\ldots ,$S_{k}\}$ is acollection of subsets of N with the property that there exist
positive numbers $\lambda_{1}$ , \ldots , $\lambda_{k}$ , called balancing coefficients, such that for each i $\in N$ we have
$\sum_{ji\in S_{j}}\lambda_{j}=1$
.
Theorem 2. ([1], [4]). Agame has anonempty core if and only if for every balanced set
$\{S_{1}, \ldots, S_{k}\}$ wit $\mathrm{h}$ balancing coeffic ient $\lambda_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $\lambda_{k}$ ,
$\sum_{j=1}^{k}\lambda_{j}v(S_{j})\leq v(N)$ .
Theorem 3. The core of the game $(N,v)$ is not empty.
Proof :For $S\subseteq N$ , we see
$\Pi_{S}(aq_{S}, ox_{S})=a\square s(q_{S}, x_{S}),\forall a\geq 0$ , an $\mathrm{d}$ $\Pi_{S}(q_{S}+q_{S}’, x_{S}+x_{\mathrm{S}}’)\geq\Pi_{S}(qs, xs)+\Pi_{S}(q_{S}’, x_{S}’)$ .
Let { $S_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , Sk} be abalanced set on $N$ and let $\lambda_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $\lambda_{k}$ be balancing coefficients. By Theorem
2, it suffices to show that the inequality $v(N)\geq\Sigma_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda_{\ell}v(S_{\ell})$ holds.
$\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda_{\ell}v(S_{\ell})=\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda\ell_{qs_{\ell}}7mxE[\mathrm{I}_{S},(q_{S_{\ell}},X_{S_{\ell}})]$
$= \sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda_{\ell}E[\Pi_{S\ell}(q_{S_{\ell}}^{*},X_{S_{\ell}})]$
$= \sum_{\ell=1}^{k}E[\Pi_{S_{\ell}}(\lambda\ell q_{S_{\ell}}^{*}, \lambda_{\ell}X_{S},)]$
$=E[ \sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\Pi_{S_{\ell}}(\lambda\ell q_{S_{\ell}}^{*}, \lambda_{\ell}X_{S_{\ell}})]$
$\leq E[\square _{N}(\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda\ell\overline{q_{S_{\ell}}^{*}},\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\lambda_{\ell}X_{S_{\ell}})]$
$\leq\max_{qN}E[\Pi_{N}(q_{N}, X_{N})]=v(N)$ .
Here $-q_{S\ell}^{*}$ is avector with $n$ components and it is the extension of the vector $q_{S_{\ell}}^{*}$ and obtained
by adding zeros. $\bullet$
4. Discussions on Models with Two Periods
In this section we propose two models (Models Iand $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}$ ) with two periods and discuss on
their properties. The difference between two models is whether or not excess demands in the
first period could be transfered to the second period. Excess supplies could be transfered in
both models.
Model I:Excess demands or excess supplies in the first period could be transfered to the
second period. Suppose aretailer $i$ behaves by himself. Suppose $x_{i}^{t}$ , $(t=1,2)$ is arealized value
of the demand $X_{i}^{t}$ , $(t=1,2)$ and $q_{i}^{t}$ , $(t=1,2)$ is an order quantity at the $t$-th period. We assum$\mathrm{e}$
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$X_{i}^{1}$ and $X_{i}^{2}$ are independent for all i $\in N$ . For these values, we denote by $\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t},$x2), (t $=1,$ 2)
the profit at the $t$-th period.
$\Pi_{i}^{1}(q_{i}^{1},x_{i}^{1})=\{$
$(s_{i}-c_{i})q_{i}^{1}$ , if $x_{i}^{1}>q_{i}^{1}$ ;
$s_{i}x_{i}^{1}-c_{i}q_{i}^{1}$ , if $x_{i}^{1}<q_{i}^{1}$ .
When $x_{i}^{1}<q_{i}^{1}$ , the initial inventory level at the 2nd period is $q_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{1}$ . So we have
$\Pi_{i}^{2}(q_{i}^{2},x_{i}^{2})=\{$
$-c_{i}q_{i}^{2}+s_{i}(q_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}-x.!)-p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}+x_{i}^{2}-q_{i}^{1}-q_{l}^{2})$, if $x_{i}^{2}>q.!-x_{i}^{1}+q_{j}^{2}$ ;
$s_{i}x_{i}^{2}-\mathrm{q}q_{i}^{2}+r_{i}(q_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}-x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2})$ , if $x_{i}^{2}<q_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}$ .
When $x_{i}^{1}>q_{i}^{1}$ , the excess demand at the 2nd period is $x_{i}^{1}-q_{i}^{1}$ . So
$\Pi_{i}^{2}(q_{i}^{2},x_{i}^{2})=\{$
$-\mathrm{c}_{i}q_{i}^{2}+s_{i}q_{i}^{2}-p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}+x_{i}^{2}-q_{i}^{1}-q_{i}^{2})$ , if $x_{i}^{2}>q_{i}^{1}-x_{t}^{1}+q^{2}.\cdot$ ;
$-\mathrm{c}_{\iota}q_{i}^{2}+s_{i}(x_{i}^{1}+x_{i}^{2}-q_{i}^{1})+r_{i}(q.!+q_{i}^{2}-x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2})$ , if $x_{i}^{2}<q_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}$ .
From these,
$\sum_{t=1}^{2}\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t},x_{i}^{t})=(s_{t}-\mathrm{q})(q.+!q_{i}^{2})-rmx\{.p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}+x^{2}\dot{.}-q_{i}^{1}-q_{i}^{2}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}^{1}+q^{2}\dot{.}-x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2})\}$. (7)
Suppose acoalition $S$ transfers demands at the both periods so that $\xi^{1}(S)=\mathrm{x}\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{S})$ and
$\xi^{2}(S)=\mathrm{x}\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{S})$ . By letting $q_{i}:=q_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}$ and $\xi_{i}:=\xi_{i}^{1}+\xi_{i}^{2}$ for all $i\in S$ , we see, ffom (7) and (2),
$\sum_{t=1}^{2}\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t},\xi_{i}^{t})=\Pi_{i}(q_{i},\xi_{i})$ .
Here $\xi(S)=\mathrm{x}\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{S})+x^{2}(S)$ So, the analysis of this model reduces to that in the previous
aec tion $\mathrm{s}$ .
Model $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}$ :fficess demands could not be transfered but excess supplies in the first period
could be transfered to the second period. Let $y_{i}^{t}$ be the initial inventory level at the t-th
period for the retailer $i$ . The profit in the first period is:
$\Pi_{i}^{1}(q_{i}^{1},x_{i}^{1},y^{1}(=0))=\{$
$(s_{i}-c_{i})q.!-p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}-q_{i}^{1})$ , if $x_{i}^{1}>q_{i}^{1}$ ;
$s_{i}x_{i}^{1}-c_{t}q_{i}^{1}$ , if $x_{i}^{1}<q_{i}^{1}$ .
Suppose the initial inventory level is $y^{2}\geq 0$ at the 2nd period. The profit in this period is :
$\Pi_{i}^{2}(q_{i}^{2},x_{i}^{2},y^{2})=\{$
$-\mathrm{q}q^{2}\dot{.}+s_{i}(y^{2}+q_{i}^{2})-p_{i}(x_{i}^{2}-y^{2}-q_{i}^{2})$ , if $x_{i}^{2}>y^{2}+q_{i}^{2}$ ;
$s_{i}x_{i}^{2}-c_{i}q_{i}^{2}+r_{i}(y^{2}+q_{i}^{2}-x_{i}^{2})$, if $x_{i}^{2}<y^{2}+q_{i}^{2}$ .
When $x_{i}^{1}<q_{i}^{1}$ , we let $y^{1}=0,y^{2}=q_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{1}$ and we have
$\sum\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t},x_{i}^{t},y^{t})=(s_{i}-c_{i})(q.+!q_{i}^{2})-\max\{p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}+x_{i}^{2}-q_{i}^{1}-q_{i}^{2}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2}-x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2})\}2$ .
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When $x_{l}^{1}>q_{l}^{1}$ , we let $y^{1}=0$ , $y^{2}=0$ and
$\sum_{t=1}^{2}\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t},x_{i}^{t},y^{t})=(s_{i}-c_{i})(q_{i}^{1}+q_{i}^{2})-p_{i}(x_{i}^{1}-q_{l}^{1})-rmx\{p_{i}(x_{i}^{2}-q_{i}^{2}), (s_{i}-r_{i})(q_{i}^{2}-x_{i}^{2})\}$ .
The purpose of the retailer $i$ is to determine $q_{i}^{t},t=1,2$ so that $E[ \sum_{t=1}^{2}\Pi_{i}^{t}(q_{i}^{t}, X_{i}^{t},y^{t})]$ is maxi-
mi $\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ . From the ab $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ ,
$E[ \Pi_{i}^{2}(q, X, y)]=\int_{0}^{q+y}\{s_{i}x-c_{t}q+r_{i}(q+y-x)\}f(x)dx+\int_{q+y}^{\infty}\{s_{i}(q+y)-c_{\mathrm{t}}q-p_{i}(x-q-y)\}f(x)dx$,
and so $\frac{\partial^{2}E[\Pi_{\mathrm{i}}^{2}(q,X,y)]}{\partial q^{2}}<0$ . Letting $\frac{\partial E[\Pi^{2}(q,X,y)]}{\partial q}\dot{.}=0$ , $E[\Pi^{2}\dot{.}(q,X,y)]$ is maximized when
$\int_{0}^{q+y}f(x)dx=\frac{s_{i}+p_{i}-c_{l}}{s_{i}+p_{i}-r_{i}}$ .
In each period, demands are transfered among members in any coalition after demands are
realized. This model would be analyzed in detail in the future.
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